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CATHERINE J. JONES· 
We tend to live-or think we live-in a generically driven soci­
ety. Sizes are unisex; directions on medicine bottles are written for 
adults or children (that's as specific as it gets); medical research 
often is conducted on patient populations that exclude many of the 
persons most affected by the conditions being studied, often in the 
name of "protecting" them. Our generic standards are no more ge­
neric, though, than Chief Justice Tmdal's Nineteenth Century asser­
tion that those charged with negligent behavior would be judged by 
a standard of the "man of ordinary prudence."1 Although Chief 
Justice Tmdal's standard was subsequently interpreted to be gender 
neutral and generic, my guess is that when he said "man of ordinary 
prudence" he meant just that. 
I believe in making legal the giving of assistance to those who 
would choose to end their lives by other than natural causes.2 I am 
not sure my position on legalization of assisted dying is correct. 
What I am sure of, however, is that if we frame the question in 
terms of the so-called generic patient-if we do not consider issues 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of LaW; B.A., Gettys­
burg College; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; L.L.M., Yale Law School. This 
article was originally presented at the Physician-Assisted Suicide Symposium at West­
ern New England College School of Law on October 18, 1996. I have made minor 
revisions to the text since that time. 
My thanks to David Moss, who may give new meaning to the expression "Fools 
rush in where angels fear to tread." Last spring, when David called to tell me about his 
plans for the Conference, I was overwhelmed that a new teacher, teaching four new 
courses in his first year at an institution, would take on such a major task. I knew, 
however, that David is very competent and I could hear the enthusiasm in his voice, so I 
encouraged him. The Conference was the result of that competence and enthusiasm. 
My thanks also to Joan Mahoney who, as Dean of the law school, told David to "Go for 
it" when he presented her with his ideas. Her support was crucial to the Conference. 
Finally, I am very grateful to Michele Dill LaRose and Pat Newcombe of the law 
school's library staff without whose assistance this paper would not have been com­
pleted, or even started. Michele's and Pat's work exemplifies what is both routine and 
best about the Jaw school's superb library staff. 
1. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837). 
2. I prefer the term "assisted dying" rather than "physician-assisted suicide" be­
cause of the negative connotations associated with the word "suicide." 
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relating specifically to gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
age, and different degrees of physical or mental ability-we cannot 
possibly reach the appropriate answer. 
Before examining the ambiguities, what certainties do we 
know about self-inflicted death and assisted death? We know that 
in 1990, 12.25 out of every 100,000 people in the United States died 
by intentional self-inflicted means.3 We also know that those num­
bers may be low because frequently deaths that occur by overdose 
are classified as having resulted from natural causes.4 We know 
that in 1991, intentional, self-inflicted death was the eighth leading 
cause of death in the United States and that most of those dying by 
this method were white men.S We know that women attempt sui­
cide at six times the rate of men, but that men die more often.6 
The reason why men die more often is that they tend to use 
more violent means.7 We know that men succeed at self-inflicted 
death more often than women because guns are 95 % lethal in sui­
cide attempts.8 Women often attempt to die by overdose, a fre­
quently ineffective method of killing oneself.9 What we do not 
necessarily know, however, is why women choose to attempt to 
take their lives by pill rather than by another method. Many hy­
potheses exist: women really do not want to die; rather, the attempt 
by pill is to draw attention and to ask for help. Women are less 
violent than men and therefore less prone to use more violent 
means of taking their lives. Women, always the caretakers, worry 
3. See Julie Marquis, 32% Dip in State Sui~ides Found as U.S. Rate Rises, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, at B1. 
4. See Jim O'Connell, Suicide Rate is Worrisome, PATRIOT LEDGER, Feb. 15, 
1996, at 17. 
5. See Marquis, supra note 3. 
6. See Gun-Suicide High Among Harris County Women, AUSTIN AMERICAN­
STATESMAN, Mar. 20, 1995, at B2. 
7. For example, three quarters of all elderly men who commit suicide do so by 
gun. See Don Colburn, U.S. Suicide Rate Rises 9% for Elderly Since '80, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, Jan. 26, 1996, at 1. Men also tend to commit suicide by hanging or by 
jumping from tall buildings. See Stephanie Gutmann, Death and the Maiden: Dr. 
Kevorkian's Woman Problem, NEW REPUBLIC, June 24, 1996, at 20, available in 
WESTLAW, HWD database. As most readers know, Nancy Cruzan was a young pa­
tient in a persistent vegetative state whose right to have feeding tubes withdrawn was 
ultimately argued before the United States Supreme Court. See Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). How ironic that the father who loved 
her, and carried forward the fight to have her treatment withdrawn, took his own life by 
hanging. See Eric Pace, Lester Cruzan is Dead at 62; Fought to Let His Daughter Die, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at B12. 
8. See Gun-Suicide High Among Harris County Women, supra note 6. 
9. See Gutmann, supra note 7. 
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much more about the stress on those who will find them dead and 
would prefer to present a peaceful image rather than a body dis­
torted by violence.1o 
We also know that the self inflicted death rate among the eld­
erly is rising rapidly. Those over the age of sixty-five account for 
13% of our population, and for 20% of the country's suicides.ll 
The suicide rate for elderly white men is 38.4 per 100,000,12 more 
than three times the national rate for the population as a whole.13 
The elderly actually attempt suicide less often than the population 
in general, but they have a higher rate of causing their death. This 
may be because they are more deliberate than younger people and 
almost certainly because three-fourths of the elderly men and one­
third of the elderly women attempting suicide do so by gun.14 
In terms of assisted dying, what do we know? We know that 
almost three-fourths of the country's population agree that some 
people in some situations should be able to seek the assistance of 
another in dying without legal liability attaching to the one assist­
ing.1S Those situations relate more to physical pain than to non­
physical circumstances such as a fear of being a burden to one's 
family or feeling thatlife is not worth living.16 The country's physi­
cians are fairly well divided on the question of assisted dying, with 
support or opposition frequently varying by specialtyP Studies 
10. See Leslie Bender, A FeministAnalysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Vol­
untary Active Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REv. 519, 521 n.4 (1992); Nancy J. Osgood & 
Susan A. Eisenhandler, Gender and Assisted and Acquiescent Suicide: A Suicidologist's 
Perspective, 9 ISSUES L. & MEo. 361 (1994). 
11. See Colburn, supra note 7. 
12. See Larry Lipman, Elderly's Suicide Rate Stirs Concern; Doctors Urged to Be 
on Lookout, ATLANTA J., July 31, 1996, at A6. 
13. In 1990, the suicide rate for the total population of the United States was 
12.25 per 100,000. See Marquis, supra note 3. 
14. See Jeff Kunerth, Suicide Rate Peaks Among the Elderly, and It's on the Rise, 
HOUSTON CHRONlCLE, Sept. 15, 1996, at AI; Colburn, supra note 7, at 1. 
15. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et aI., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 
LANCET, June 29, 1996, at 1805, available in WESTLAW, P-ABS database; see also 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom Wash­
ington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Hears 2 
Cases Involving Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, at A1. The fact that three­
quarters of the population believe some patients should be permitted to seek assistance 
in dying does not, of course, mean that three-quarters of the population would seek 
such assistance if they were in such a situation. 
16. See Emanuel, supra note 15. 
17. See Jonathan S. Cohen et aI., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthana­
sia Among PhYSicians in Washington State, 331 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 89 (1994). This study 
showed that 54% of physician respondents indicated that euthanasia should be legal in 
some situations, although only 33% were willing to participate in the act. Fifty-three 
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show that the medical diagnosis of those requesting, and receiving 
physician assistance in dying is primarily cancer, neurological disor­
ders, or AIDS.ls However, patients' concerns in requesting assist­
ance in dying encompass many factors that are not related to 
physical pain, including loss of control, burdening others, being de­
pendent upon others for intimate, personal care, and losing per­
sonal dignity.19 In one study done in the Netherlands, pain was 
cited as the sole reason behind a request for assistance in dying in 
only 10% of all cases, and as a major factor in fewer than 50% of 
the request for assistance cases.20 
The majority of those requesting assistance in dying appear to 
be women. Certainly that is true with those who have died with the 
assistance of Dr. Kevorkian. To date, Dr. Kevorkian has assisted at 
least forty-five individuals, thirty women and fifteen men.21 Some 
cast Dr. Kevorkian as a misogynist who aims most of his activity at 
women and only works with men when people begin to wonder why 
so many women die in his presence. Stephanie Gutmann, writing in 
The New Republic, has noted that the men who sought Dr. Kevor­
percent thought physician assisted suicide should be legal in some situations, but only 
40% indicated a willingness to assist. Hematologists and oncologists were more likely 
to oppose euthanasia and assisted suicide and psychiatrists were more likely to support 
the practices. See id. at 89. See also Geriatricians' Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide; 
Tips from Other Journals, 47 J. FAM. hAc. 949, 949 (1993) (stating that a majority of 
physicians support a patient's right to die); Report ofthe Board of Trustees ofthe Ameri­
can Medical Association; Transcript, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 81, 83 (1994) (indicating that 
the Board of Thustees of the American Medical Association opposes euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide). In a study of Colorado physicians, 60% indicated they cared 
for patients for whom they believed active euthanasia to be justifiable, and 59% indi­
cated a willingness to supply lethal drugs in such cases were the act legal. In a study of 
San Francisco physicians, 70% stated that patients with incurable terminal illnesses 
should have an active euthanasia option, but only 45% expressed a willingness to assist 
with such a request were it legal. See id. 
18. See Anthony L. Back et aI., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in 
Washington State Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919 (1996). In 
San Francisco, there is an active "underground," consisting of AIDS patients, doctors, 
lovers, and friends assisting people with AIDS in dying. See Sheryl StOlberg, Ending 
Life on Their Own Terms; An Underground Network Helps San Francisco AIDS Pa­
tients Who Choose to Die with a Doctor's Help, Surrounded by Loved Ones, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at At. A survey of 118 San Francisco physicians specializing in the 
treatment of AIDS found that 53% admitted to having helped patients commit suicide 
by writing prescriptions for narcotics. The suicide rate in such cases is artificially sup­
pressed because of the tendency to ascribe a death by overdose to "natural causes." Id. 
19. See Back et aI., supra note 18, at 921 (describing a study which reflects patient 
concerns as perceived by physicians). 
20. See Emanuel, supra note 15, at 1809. 
2t. See Todd Nissen, Kevorkian May Face More Criminal Charges, REUTERS 
NORlH AMERICAN WIRE, Nov. 4, 1996; Kevorkian Suicide List Stands at 44, BOSTON 
HERALD, Oct. 25, 1996, at 6. 
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kian's assistance had been diagnosed as terminally ill by their own 
physicians, were in constant and severe pain from their medical di­
agnoses, and often were physically incapacitated.22 The women, 
Gutmann stated, had symptoms that were much more ambiguous, 
had not been diagnosed as terminally ill, and had not been com­
plaining of severe and constant pain.23 She suggested that women, 
who seemingly worry more about their illness' impact on others, are 
more vulnerable to those like Dr. Kevorkian.24 She also noted that 
Dr. Kevorkian took so long in deciding to assist individual men that 
a number of his prospective male clients killed themselves before 
he set a date for assisting them.25 
I am not an apologist for Dr. Kevorkian and, in fact, he may be 
a misogynist. Misogyny, however, is not why women seek him out. 
They may, however, seek him out because they need assistance in 
ending their lives and the regular medical establishment will not 
generally provide it, nor will state legislatures make such assistance 
legal. 
When we talk of the so-called right to die-for the last two 
decades, withholding or withdrawing medical care and more re­
cently providing prescription drugs or even a lethal injection-the 
discussion is based in a framework which is culturally very western, 
white, heterosexual, and male focused. While the views of western, 
white, heterosexual men need to be considered, there is something 
wrong with reaching a conclusion that applies to all by using that 
framework exclusively. 
Miles and August studied final state appellate court rulings in 
cases of twenty-two patients once competent but later incompetent 
and existing on various forms of life support that their families or 
guardians sought to terminate.26 None of the individuals had exe­
cuted advanced directives addressing end-of-life decisions. Four­
teen of those cases involved women and eight involved men. In six 
out of the eight cases involving men (75%), the court determined 
what the patient's decision concerning life-sustaining treatment 
would have been, and permitted that decision to be effectuated.27 
In all six, the court determined that the patient's decision would 
22. See Gutmann, supra note 7. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. See Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right to 
Die," 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 85 (1990). 
27. See id. at 85. 
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have been to have treatment withdrawn.28 In one of the two re­
maining cases involving 'men, the court delegated decision making 
power to a family member and in the other to a physician.29 Of the 
fourteen cases involving women, in only two (14%) was the court 
able to discern the patient's preference.3o In another six (43%), the 
court delegated decision making power to a family member,31 in 
three (21 %) to a physician,32 and in three (21 %) to an institution, 
such as the court itself, or a hospital ethics committee.33 Miles and 
August found that the courts' reasoning in the cases brought on be­
half of male patients accepted evidence of the men's treatment 
preferences, and found their right to have those preferences exer­
cised a matter of autonomy.34 The courts' reasoning in the cases 
involving women found the women's expressions of preferences to 
be unreflective, emotional, or immature. Women, but not men, 
were described in childlike terms-fetal position, infantile state. 
The parens patriae doctrine was asserted only in relation to women, 
not men. The male patients were regarded by the courts as victims 
of medical assault and therefore entitled to assert their autonomy 
against that assault. Women, however, were perceived as being vul­
nerable to medical neglect. In fact, in 86% of the cases someone 
else was empowered not only to speak for them but also to decide 
what they would say.35 
So, women have been treated differently by the courts when 
compared to similarly situated men in withdrawal of treatment 
cases. Women tend to use less violent means when they attempt to 
take their own lives. They are traditional caretakers, so they do not 
want to burden others 'either with their care or with a long, slow 
death watch. Is it so hard to imagine, then, that women would seek 
the assistance of Dr. Kevorkian? Is it not understandable that if 
assisted dying is prohibited, the primary effect of that prohibition 
will fall on women because they are more reluctant or unable to 
take their own lives, and because they are not provided with legally 
sanctioned assistance? 
Some might argue that women are lucky to be so "protected," 
28. See id. at 86. 
29. See id. at frl. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. at 89. 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. at 90. 
35. See id. 
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and that in fact society should find a better way to protect men. 
That, of course, raises the question of whether women need to be, 
or want to be, protected. It is reminiscent of the issues surrounding 
surrogate motherhood's debate in which even the feminist commu­
nity is split over whether surrogacy should be prohibited in order to 
protect the vulnerable from exploitation, or whether all women, in­
cluding the poor and minority, should be accorded full decision­
making power as competent adults. 
Just as women may have concerns different from men in end­
of-life decision making, those of different races or ethnicities, those 
who are not heterosexual, those who are elderly, those who are not 
able bodied, may have concerns different from able-bodied, hetero­
sexual, white men. Those concerns must be taken into account in 
formulating any rules concerning assisted dying. 
One of the major arguments offered in opposition to assisted 
dying is that the economically disadvantaged or racial and ethnic 
minorities might become vulnerable to the assisted dying process. 
Such a scenario is unlikely. First, white men are much more likely 
to die of self-inflicted death than any other group in this country.36 
Second, non-Hispanic whites are much more likely to execute ad­
vanced directives-making formal plans for end-of-life decision 
making-than are members of minority groupS.37 In fact, only 2% 
of Asian Americans have formalized their end-of-life plans, 
although they frequently tell their physicians their wishes, trusting 
the spoken word over a writing.38 Some Asian American elders do 
name surrogate decision makers, generally a son, for end-of-life de­
cision making,39 reflecting the position of sons in Asian society. Af­
rican Americans and Hispanics are also less likely than non­
Hispanic whites to designate a surrogate, but if they do, the surro­
gate is likely to be a daughter, reflecting the importance that wo­
men play in African American and Hispanic families and social 
structures.40 African Americans and Hispanics are also much more 
likely to favor aggressive treatment at the end of life,41 possibly 
based on distrust resulting from lifetimes of discrimination and less 
than optimum medical care. 
36. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
37. See Culture Explains People's Attitudes Toward Living Wills (National Public 
Radio, Morning Edition, Aug. 28, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Scripts File. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
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People from differ~nt cultures may also disagree over the no­
tion of a "good death." Hospice care for the dying emphasizes a 
peaceful, accepted death, at home with family present: in essence, a 
white, middle class death. African Americans, however, are not as 
favorably disposed to hospice care.42 After all, admission to the 
hospice program requires accepting the inevitability of death within 
months and agreeing to forego aggressive end-of-life treatment, 
which, to some, is tantamount to giving up or surrendering.43 Those 
of Chinese descent may not want to die at home because of cultural 
beliefs that their ghost will haunt the place where they died, and 
they do not want to impose that on their family.44 
Of course, there is also the obvious danger when we begin to 
consider the beliefs and traditions of those from different cultures, 
that we will make assumptions based on stereotype. That is, we 
might now assume that an African American patient wants aggres­
sive care and that an Asian American prefers death in an institution 
rather than at home. And, those assumptions might be wrong.45 
The message is that we must not operate on, or construct our rules 
and our procedures based on, assumption, but rather on what we 
know and learn from those at the center of our discussion. 
Again at the risk of falling into opposite stereotypes, serious 
scholars have shown us that not all people think alike, not all peo­
ple make decisions in the same way.46 When those courts deciding 
withdrawal of treatment cases involving women patients referred to 
the expressions of preference by women as unreflective, emotional, 
or immature, and when the women assisted by Dr. Kevorkian were 
described as having more ambiguous symptoms than the men 
whom he assisted, what the courts and the author may well have 
been describing was not the indecisiveness of which we traditionally 
accuse women, but rather a reflection of women's means of making 
decisions.47 Women and perhaps members of many ethnic and cul­
tural groups are much less individually oriented and much more 
communally oriented than non-Hispanic white men. That sense of 
42. See Barbara A. Koenig & Jan Gates-Williams, Understanding Cultural Differ­
ence in Caring for Dying Patients: Caring for Patients at the End of Life, 163 W.J. MED. 
244 (1995). 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. 
46. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (examining the different modes of thinking be­
tween men and women). 
47. See id. at 71-74. 
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relationship is reflected in their conversations, in their decision 
making patterns, and in the effectuation of their decisions.48 
Rather than attempting to force women and minorities into the 
mold we have developed for end-of-life decision making, including 
how we deal with assisted death, we need to consider how our prac­
tices should reflect differences among all members of our society. 
The simplest solution would be to say that assisted death will 
be prohibited. That way there will be no negative repercussions 
from incorrect diagnoses, no coercion of the vulnerable, and no sug­
gestion that physicians violate their ethical codes. Sometimes, I 
find that argument appealing and one I can defend, because I too 
fear that mistakes sometimes will be made, that the diagnosis may 
not be correct, that the patient may be suffering from a treatable 
mental illness from which she may recover and live a long, satisfy­
ing life. 
On the other hand, I find myself tom both professionally and 
personally. There are persons in pain so severe it cannot be allevi­
ated, there are persons so overcome by life's circumstances that 
their non-physical pain also cannot be soothed, there are those 
whose personal dignity is so invaded that I have serious doubts 
about a blanket prohibition on assisted death. Many know the 
story of Dax Cowart, a man severely burned in a gas line explosion 
who begged to have treatment withdrawn so he could die and es­
cape the pain.49 His treatment was not withdrawn and he survived. 
His life subsequent to his recovery has seen a marriage that did not 
work, but a second one that did; a law degree; attempts at suicide; 
severe vision and hearing impairments.50 Today Mr. Cowart says 
his life is worth living, but he also says that despite that, he thinks 
his wishes regarding withdrawal of treatment should have been 
honored, and he should have been allowed to die. 51 I would not 
presume to second guess Dax Cowart, and I do not think the law 
should do so either. 
My own personal concern goes even further than the compe­
tent patient in intractable pain or near death from cancer or AIDS. 
My personal concern would take us down that slippery slope to the 
48. See id. at 8-9, 16-17, 169-74. 
49. See Leslie Sowers, Bum Victim is Working to Ensure Patients' Rights, TIMES­
PICAYUNE, Sept. 21, 1996, at A15; Christine Wicker, 'Can't You See I'm a Dead Man?' 
Miracle Workers Made Dax Cowart Survive; He Still Wishes They Hadn't, CHI. TRIB., 
May 18, 1989, at Cl. 
50. See Sowers, supra note 49; Wicker, supra note 49. 
51. See Sowers, supra note 49; Wicker, supra note 49. 
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incompetent patient who made end-of-life decisions concerning as­
sisted dying when she was competent. I have watched Alzheimer's 
Disease destroy people of three generations in my family-my 
great-grandfather, his daughter (who was my grandmother), and 
her daughter (who was my mother). I did not know Grandpa 
Moore very well, but I have heard a lot about him. I knew my 
grandmother and my mother very well. They were proud, bright, 
capable, fiercely independent women. They rarely asked anyone 
for anything, and my mother was the classic caretaker. They valued 
their dignity above all other personal characteristics, and they never 
wanted anyone to take care of them. When my grandmother be­
came ill and deteriorated through confusion to the point where she 
was a danger to herself, to the stage where she could no longer live 
alone, to the days in which she was in a nursing home, finally bed­
ridden, and unable to speak during the last several years of her life, 
I heard my mother wish for her mother's death on many occasions, 
and wish for her own if she ever seemed headed for the same end. 
Eventually, she did head to that end. She was somewhat luckier 
than Grandma; her disease progressed faster, an eight to ten year 
duration. Unlike Grandma, who was over ninety years old when 
she died, my mother died at the age of seventy-six. Furthermore, 
unlike Grandma, my mother never went to a nursing home because 
my sister sacrificed two years of her own life to care for her. How­
ever, despite the fact that she was: cared for by a loving daughter, 
she had lost that quick, bright mind that she valued so, and she 
suffered personal indignities that most of us care not to think about. 
Naturally, I wonder if I am next in line. 
When Janet Adkins sought and received Dr. Kevorkian's 
assistance in dying, many people were appalled not only at him, but 
at her. She was in her fifties and had recently been diagnosed with 
Alzheimer's.52 The week before her death, she was able to play 
tennis with her son and even to win the match, but she could not 
remember the score.53 Janet Adkins feared what her life would be 
like over the course of her disease. I assume she knew that should 
she become incompetent she could no longer seek assistance in dy­
ing, so she acted while she was competent and still had time. Had 
Janet Adkins known that when her disease reached a certain point 
she would in fact be assisted in dying, she might not have sought 
52. See Bonnie Johnson et aI., A Vital Woman Chooses Death, PEOPLE, June 25, 
1990, at 40. 
53. See id. 
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Dr. Kevorkian's assistance when she did. I~ fact, many people who 
die from intentional self-inflicted injuries might choose to live 
longer if they could be assured that someone would help them to 
end their lives at a future time. 
I think we talk much too theoretically and perhaps disingenu­
ously about end-of-life decision making. Admittedly, I worry that 
when we move away from abstractions the debate focuses on 
"worst case" scenarios. The opponents raise the specter of the pov­
erty stricken, eighty-five year old woman, alone, in the nursing 
home with no one to care for her and protect her, and the propo­
nents compare the inhumane treatment of patients in intractable 
pain with the humane euthanasia of dying pets. I agree with those 
who equate withdrawal of treatment with assisted death. The per­
son from whom the ventilator or feeding tubes are withdrawn dies 
because she can no longer breathe or because she no longer draws 
sustenance. The physician or some other person acted to create 
that end. It is disingenuous to pretend that assisted dying is not 
going on every day, not only through withdrawal of treatment but 
through injections of lethal doses of pain killers, and through the 
writing of prescriptions. Compassion in Dying v. Washington 54 and 
Quill v. Vacco 55 did not come from suddenly discovered scenarios. 
Those cases just happen to be the first legal challenges to statutes 
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, brought by, and because of, 
physicians who fear legal liability for assisting others in dying just as 
they earlier feared legal liability if they were to withdraw life-sus­
taining treatment from patients.56 
It is naive or hypocritical to pretend that, whatever the Court's 
decision, assisted dying will not continue. Rules relating to end-of­
life decision making are made by the living and may well be based 
on what we hope, or fear, will happen to us when the rules are 
applied. While those opposed to assisted dying may caution those 
in favor "to be careful what they wish for because they might get 
it," the proponents of assisted dying might urge the same caution 
against the opponents. Furthermore, since assisted dying occurs on 
a regular basis, with the agreement and participation of health care 
providers, some of those who publicly oppose assisted death may 
well believe that if their pain-however it is defined-is ever so 
54. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. 
Ed. 2d 772 (1997). 
55. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997). 
56. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666-67 (N.J. 1976). 
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great they cannot continue living, they will have access to assistance 
in dying, even if such assistance is prohibited.57 
Perhaps I believe as I do, or at least think the discussion to be 
both too theoretical and disingenuous because I am a woman. 
may think and communicate differently than others engaging in this 
debate. I am much more persuaded by individual scenarios than I 
am by theory. I believe that not only is it permissible for the debate 
to be emotional, but also that we will lose important perspectives if 
we do not allow it to be emotional. I do not claim to be objective in 
the assisted dying debate. Nor do I claim that my views are neces­
sarily correct or that my way of thinking is the only appropriate 
approach to the topic. I claim only that to define the terms of the 
debate in the traditional western, white, heterosexual male analyti­
cal method will lead to the wrong conclusion for many.58 I have 
long told my students that the times I worry most about my ideas, 
and the times I most need to continue to think about them, is when 
I truly believe I am right. I think that is a fitting caution for all who 
engage in the assisted dying discussion. 
There is no objection that has been raised to assisted dying that 
was not also raised to withholding or withdrawing treatment, yet, 
the fears that were forecast when the withdrawal of treatment cases 
were being decided have not materialized. The elderly, the dis­
abled, the poor, and members of minority groups have not been 
coerced into having treatment withheld. We have not seen any 
57. Such a scenario would not be unlike that which existed before abortion be­
came a legally protected procedure. Despite prohibitions on abortion, many women 
from educated, financially secure situations were able to procure abortions, frequently 
under the guise of therapeutic gynecologic treatment. There is no reason to believe that 
those who oppose assistance in dying for the general population would not avail them­
selves of access to assisted dying for themselves or their loved ones, further illustrating 
the disingenuousness of the opponents' arguments. Some readers may accuse me of 
raising unsubstantiated fears about those who oppose assisted dying. However, one of 
the participants in this symposium, an articulate critic of assisted dying, made exactly 
this suggestion to me, indicating that I need not fear an outcome like my ancestors', 
even if assisted dying is banned, because I will be educated enough and savvy enough to 
find someone to help me die even if the practice is prohibited. 
Of course the reverse analogy is even worse. That is, like women who sought ille­
gal, "back alley" abortions before the procedure became legal (and still do in those 
instances where abortion is geographically or financially beyond their means), some of 
those who want assistance in dying will tum to "back alley" specialists. Indeed, at least 
forty-five individuals have already sought the assistance of Dr. Kevorkian. The result of 
those decisions-if the procedure is "botched"-may be continued life in an even worse 
physical, mental, or emotional condition. . 
58. In fact, one of the mistakes we make in this debate is to assume that there is 
one conclusion to be reached. There may well be many appropriate conclusions based 
upon many factors relevant to different people. 
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greater diminishing respect for the value of life. We have, some 
would say, started down the slope, not in the direction of withdraw­
ing care from the vulnerable, but in the direction of hastening death 
in a different manner.59 Part of that hastening, however, is more 
apparent than real given the fact that assisted dying has been occur­
ring and will continue to occur. Perhaps the vulnerable would be 
much better protected were the practice performed openly rather 
than in secret. 
Will there be mistakes made if we make assisted dying legal? 
It is hard to imagine that there will not be, just as it is hard to imag­
ine that there have not been mistakes concerning withdrawal of 
treatment. But why do we assume bad faith, rather than good faith, 
on the part of physicians, families, and society?60 And, why do we 
focus on worst case scenarios rather than engaging in the discussion 
in which we need to participate, both to determine how to set our 
standards and how to effectuate individuals' wishes? 
In his superb essay, Dying as Failure,61 Dr. Lewis Thomas 
wrote, 
It is true, as everyone says these days, that doctors do not 
know what to do about death. Patients who are known to be 
dying are segregated as much as possible from all the others, and 
as the clinically unmistakable process of dying gets under way the 
doctors spend as little time in attendance as they can manage. 
What is not so generally recognized is that doctors, espe­
cially young doctors, are as frightened and bewildered by the act 
of death as everyone else. . .. Death is shocking, dismaying, even 
terrifying. 
A dying patient is a kind of freak. It is the most unaccept­
able of all abnormalities, an offense against nature itself. 
The difference [between a hospital in the 1930s and] a mod­
em hospital, apart from the change from open wards to mostly 
59. Some of the current opponents to assisted dying were instrumental in pursu­
ing the rights of individuals to have life sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn. 
They were then opposed by others who warned that one of the next steps would be calls 
for assisted suicide or active euthanasia. Perhaps some of those who now oppose as­
sisted dying do so as a defensive reaction to those who earlier warned against the slip­
pery slope leading from withdrawal of treatment. That is, as the withdrawal of 
treatment opponents are saying "I told you so," the withdrawal of treatment propo­
nents/assisted dying opponents respond, "this far, but no further." 
60. See Bender, supra note to, at 533. 
61. Lewis Thomas, Dying as Failure, 447 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 1 
(1980). 
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private rooms, was in the age of the patients who died. Dying 
could occur, and did, at any. age. It was not an event reserved for 
the very old, or for the middle-aged patients who had reached the 
end of their long battles with cancer or heart disease or strokes. 
Many of the patients who died on the open wards of the City 
Hospital were young people, overwhelmed by an infectious dis­
ease-lobar pneumonia, meningitis, septicemia, tuberculosis­
for which there was no effective treatment of any kind. 
The inevitability of death was plainer to see in those days. 
For a great many of the ordinary illnesses that brought patients 
into the hospital, dying was the expected outcome, beyond the 
control of any doctor. Death was more normal. 
. . . Everyone knew about death at first hand; there was 
nothing unfamiliar or even queer about the phenomenon. Peo­
ple seem to have known a lot more about the process itself than 
is the case today. The "deathbed" was a real place, and the dying 
person usually knew where he was and when it was time to as­
semble the family and call for the priest. 
Today, the average span of human life in our society stands 
at around 73 years, the longest run at living yet achieved. Obvi­
ously, most of the dying is done by old people. It makes a differ­
ent sort of problem for the human mind. Dying is not so often 
the tragic striking-down that it was; it is more like the end of a 
slow process of running-down, more like a slow collapse. We 
know about its inevitability, but we do not have the same appre­
hension that it is there, waiting just around the comer, ready to 
leap. 
And so we have come, just in the past 40 years, to view 
death as a sort of failure, just as we now look at the process of 
aging itself as failure. We have lost, in this changed view, the old 
feeling of respect for dying, and all the awe. 
I do not know what we are doing to the first-hand experi­
ence of dying itself with our techilology, but I suspect we may 
often be interfering with an important process. 
Dying is a process, I believe. I'm not sure of it, but I think 
so. The organism seems to come apart in orderly stages. 
Most of the time, it is not a bad feeling. Sir William Osler 
wrote about it, pointing out that the popular notion of death ag­
ony was a fiction; people died, at the moment of the dying, in 
tranquility. 
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The time may come when medicine will have found out 
enough about disease mechanisms to think its way around all of 
today's other lethal human diseases, as effectively as by the tech­
niques for treating infection. We may be left then with no way of 
dying except by wearing out in old age, barring trauma. It will be 
the kind of event we now call natural death, ending the lives of 
very old people in their sleep. 
Meanwhile, we are part way along. We have not lost our 
fear of dying, nor our sense of its ultimate inevitability. But I am 
afraid that we have lost something else-our respect for it. In a 
sense quite new to our culture we have become ashamed of 
death, and we try to hide it, or hide ourselves away from it. It is, 
to our way of thinking, failure.62 
As we continue the debate on assisted dying, perhaps we need 
to remember that dying is not an event, but the end of the process 
of living. And in providing individuals with options in the dying 
process we need to consider whether, rather than decreasing our 
respect for life, we are in fact increasing that respect. Perhaps we 
need to think of death not as failure, but as a successful, dignified, 
humane end to a life well lived. 
EPILOGUE 
As this volume was going to press, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed the decisions of the Circuit Courts in Compassion in 
Dying v. Washington and Quill v. Vacco.63 Those decisions will not 
end assisted dying. Rather, the practice will continue as it has until 
now-patients will die as their morphine is increased and their 
breathing suppressed; some physicians will prescribe drugs that 
they know will be lethal to their patients if the patients take an 
excessive amount; in the worst case scenario, family members and 
friends will kill, sometimes using violent means, their loved ones 
who beg to die. Occasionally, mistakes will still be made-both in 
those instances where patients are assisted in dying and in those 
where they are not. Had the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions 
in Compassion in Dying v. Washington and Quill v. Vacco, states 
would have begun to search for new ways to regulate assisted dying. 
With the reversal, assisted dying proponents will search for new 
ways to change the law and continue the practice. The effort of 
62. Id. at 2-4. 
63. See Vacco v. Quill, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 138 
. L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997). 
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both sides must recognize that the issues raised by assisted dying 
have many appropriate responses and solutions. In crafting those 
responses, both proponents and opponents of assisted dying must 
take into account the life circumstances of all those affected by as­
sisted dying. To paraphrase the eloquence of Dr. Thomas, to do 
otherwise is failure. 
